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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KEN MERENA, an individual, and
dba MERENA INVESTMENTS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v,
ALICE DAVIS (fka ALICE MERENA),

Case No.:

20110377-CA

Defendant and Appellee/

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT:
Appellee maintains that this Court lacks jurisdiction
to hear this appeal, because the Appellant has improperly
sought to appeal a nonfinal order.
addressed at Argument I below.

This issue is more fully

Inasmuch as this Court lacks

jurisdiction to hear the appeal, it should dismiss the
appeal forthwith.

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS:
Rule 10(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
governs motions to dismiss an appeal - for lack of
jurisdiction.

It provides: "A party may move at any time to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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dismiss the appeal or the petition for review on the basis
that the appellate court lacks jurisdiction."
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
governs orders entered by the district courts.

It provides

Unless the court approves the proposed order
submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless
otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing
party shall, within fifteen days after the
court's decision, serve upon the other parties
a proposed order in conformity with the court's
decision. Objections to the proposed order
shall be filed within five days after service.
The party preparing the order shall file the
proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to
object.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
A.

Nature of the Case:
This case concerns a claim for defamation, filed by Ken

Merena against his former spouse, Alice Davis.

Following

the filing of this case, the parties' marital relationship
was subsequently dissolved through an annulment.
At different stages throughout the pendency of this
case, Merena has been represented by several different
attorneys, and he also has represented himself.
Contemporaneously with the pendency of this action, Merena
has also been engaged as a party in a number of other legal
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p r o c e e d i n g s involving Davis, including but not limited to a
-divorce/annulment action, a protective order p r o c e e d i n g , an
action to challenge Davis' bankruptcy filing in the State of
M o n t a n a , and a second defamation case he filed against Davis
:i i i ::i :i s 1: r :i • :: t :: :> i :i r t :i r 1 I J t a I: :t
counsel ir I these other m a t t e r s .

I: 1 s r e i I a 1: I a s b e e n r e p r e s e r I t e d 1:

Employing an army of

attorneys to represent him, and usir i.g litigation as a sword,
he has m o u n t e d a p e r s i s t e n t , ongoing campaign to harass
Davis, strangle her with litigation, and destroy her
f :i i lancia 1
Merena's litigation abuse has not gone unnoticed.
Instead,

il li IL. n.\. ulh.'d in multiple; sanctions being

levied

against him, including m o n e t a r y sanctions for costs and
attorney fees, civi 1 contempt sanctions and also the filing
i) f • :: r :i in i n a ] c h a r g e s :i :i I 11 I e S t a t e • : • f 1 1 o n t a n a (w 1 I i c 1 :i :i : • B m a :i n
p e n d i n g and unresolved) .

E "acing m o u n t i n g pressure to m e e t

1: i :i s 1 e g a 1 r e s p o i i s i b i 1 i t i e s , M e r e i i a I : a s i i o w f led f r o m U t a h .
To the best of A p p e l l e e ' s knowledge, he is currently
residing out of the country,- where he appears content to
litigate this m a t t e r from a perceived safe-distance, a] ]
with the active aid and assistance of counsel.
A mo r e d e t a i 1 e d a c c o i I i I :: e: f M e r e r I a' s a b u s i v e a i I • :I

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vexatious litigation tactics, and the efforts undertaken by
different courts of law to deal with those tactics, is more

<

particularly set forth in the Appellee's Statement of Facts,

infra.
I

B.

Trial Court Proceedings & Disposition:
The course of the proceedings in this case, and the

disposition of the case below, is found infra

(

in the

Appellee's Statement of Facts.
i

C.

Merenar s Prior Efforts to Appeal:
This appeal is not the first occasion by Merena to seek

an appeal of the lower court's decisions.

Instead, he has

already twice attempted unsuccessful appeals.

His prior

appeals have either been summarily denied or summarily

*

dismissed, as more particularly noted below:
1.

First Effort to Appeal:

On or about September 4,

2009, Merena filed a petition for interlocutory appeal,
which was assigned case number 20090723-CA.
petition was summarily denied as untimely
Court dated September 11, 2009.
2.

Merena's

by Order of this

Addendum 1.

Second Effort to Appeal:

On or about November 10,

4
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(

2009, Merena attempted a second appeal by filing a notice of
appeal, purporting to appeal the "final" order of the lower
court dated October 30, 2009.

Addendum 1.

This second

appeal was transferred to the court of appeals and assigned
case number 20090941-CA.

This Court subsequently issued a

Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition on December 1,
2009, asserting that it appeared that Merena was seeking to
take an appeal from a non-final order.

Merena's appeal was

promptly dismissed by this Court on December 21, 2009,
pursuant to the parties' stipulation of dismissal".
1.

Addendum

Shortly before dismissing the appeal, this Court also•

entered an Order dated December 4, 2009, denying Merena's
Petition for Emergency Relief for Stay of District Court
Proceedings.

D.

Id.

Statement of Facts:
The following facts are pertinent to the disposition of

this appeal:
1.

Merena and Davis were at one time briefly married

to each other, but the parties' relationship deteriorated
and they separated in August of 2007.

P.. at 2-3.

Davis

subsequently filed a petition for divorce from Merena on

5
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August 20, 2007.
2.

R. at 3.

Thereafter, Merena initiated the instant case by

filing a complaint for defamation and injunctive relief
against Davis on October 22, 2007, civil number 070915206,
Judge Lindberg presiding.

R. at 1-10.

Merena's complaint

was filed with the assistance of counsel.
3.

Id.

On or about January 30, 2008, Davis filed a

petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief in the District of
Montana, case number 08-60066, Judge Kirscher presiding.
The following day, Davis filed a notice of Chapter 13
bankruptcy filing with the district court in the case at
hand.
4.

R. at 42-45.
Davis subsequently converted her Chapter 13

bankruptcy petition to one under Chapter 7, and filed a
notice of case conversion with the district court on May 2,
2008.
5.
case.

R. at 66-68.
Merena was listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy
With the assistance of counsel, he applied for and

subsequently obtained an unopposed order granting him relief
from the Bankruptcy Stay, thus allowing him to continue to
litigate his defamation claims against Davis in state court.
See, e.g., R. at 69-74.
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6.

Simultaneously in the State of Montana, . Merena

through counsel lodged an adversary proceeding against
Davis, seeking to object to her bankruptcy discharge.

See

R. at 1248-75.
7.

The parties engaged in discovery in state court in

the instant case, which resulted in numerous discovery
disputes arising.

Judge Lindberg held a hearing on October

30, 2008, to resolve the discovery disputes.

R. at 718-20,

733. . Both parties were represented by counsel at this
juncture of the case.
8.

At the hearing on October 30, 2008, Judge Lindberg

determined that both parties were responsible for the
discovery disputes that had arisen, but found that the
plaintiff, Ken Merena, was primarily at fault.

The court

ruled as follows: "The Court finds that a significant amount
of the fault here lies with the plaintiff, as he has been
too over-reaching in his discovery requests.

Moreover,'

plaintiff's subpoenas have been plagued with mistakes,
including a lack of proper advanced notice regarding the
issuance of subpoenas calling for the production of
documents, as well as the untimely service of deposition
notices.

However, the Court also finds that the defendant

7
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is not blameless.

In particular, the defendant has been

noncooperative with discovery, specifically with respect to
stalling discovery.

But for the defendant's bankruptcy

filing, which remains an open and active case, the Court
would deem it appropriate to appoint a special master to
assist with the resolution of further discovery disputes,
and the Court would make a preliminary allocation of special
master costs to be borne 75% by the plaintiff and 25% by the
defendant, while reserving for later determination a final
allocation of such costs."
9.

R. at 940.

Merena's adversary complaint in bankruptcy court

eventually came on for a trial in Montana, resulting in the
issuance of a lengthy memorandum decision ruling against
Merena on all counts.

As part of the bankruptcy court's

ruling, and of particular note to this proceeding, Judge
Kirscher found that Merena was "not a credible witness", and
that he [Merena] had an "apparent desire to strangle Alice
[Davis] through legal proceedings".
added).

R. at 1248-75 (emphasis

Judge Kirscher dismissed Merena's adversary

complaint with prejudice.

Id.

10-. With the continued assistance of counsel, Merena
promptly appealed the dismissal of his adversary complaint,
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but his appeal was denied.

R. at 2576-2626.

Following the

denial of Merena's bankruptcy appeal, Davis/ Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition was finally approved and discharged.

R.

at 2563-66.
11.

Thereafter, Merena continued to pursue his

defamation case against Davis in state court.

However, in

light of Davis' bankruptcy discharge, Judge Lindberg issued
a ruling precluding Merena from seeking monetary relief
against Davis.

The court limited Merena's sole remaining

claim to injunctive relief.
12.

R. at 2140-46.

Although Judge Lindberg allowed Merena's claim for

injunctive relief to proceed, she quickly became concerned
with his abusive litigation tactics, which were now
occurring pro se.

She expressed concern that Merena might

be using this case for an improper purpose to vex and harass
Davis, and deemed it appropriate to warn him about his
conduct, issuing a ruling as follows:
a.

"[T]he Court does not want discovery to be a

tool for Mr. Merena to harass Defendant".
b.

R. at 1377-81.

"To be sure, the nature of Plaintiff's

[discovery] questions to Defendant and Mr. Morrison
[Defendant's counsel], as well as Mr. Merena's other

9
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tactics, lead the Court to question the legitimacy of this
law suit, or whether the suit is just an avenue for him to
harass Defendant.

For now, the Court will give Mr. Merena

the benefit of the doubt and allow him to pursue his claims.
However, Mr. Merena is put on notice that the Court will not
tolerate further obstreperous behavior on his part.
Merena cannot

Mr.

continue with abusive discovery practices."

Id. (emphasis added).
13.

In a subsequent Ruling and Order dated June 22,

2009, Judge Lindberg granted Merena a limited extension of
discovery for the sole purpose of taking three final
depositions.

However, the Court placed a one-hour time

limit on those depositions, ordered that they be completed
within 45 days, and explicitly instructed Merena to comply
with the Standards of Professionalism and Civility as
promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court.
14.

[R. at 1860-63].

After being explicitly warned by Judge Lindberg to

improve his behavior in this case, and to limit his
discovery to certain well-defined parameters, Merena
proceeded to commit additional discovery abuses, ignoring
the limitations that had been imposed upon him.
87. •
10
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R. at 2213-

15.

In response to Merena's improper, abusive

litigation tactics, Davis filed a motion for sanctions
against him.

As- part of the motion, Davis sought the

dismissal of Merena's complaint.

Jd.

In ruling on the

matter, Judge Lindberg found Merena to be in clear violation
of her orders and finally deemed it necessary to dismiss his
remaining cause of action with prejudice.

She also imposed

additional monetary sanctions against Merena.

R. at 2498-

2505.
16.

Thereafter, Merena refused to comply with the

court's sanction orders, refusing to pay the monetary
sanctions in a timely fashion.

As a result, Davis commenced

contempt of court proceedings against him.. On August 18,
2010, Judge Lindberg found Merena in contempt of court.
Among other things, she imposed court fines of $2,000.00
against him, and issued a bench warrant for his arrest,
setting a cash only bail in the amount of $20,007.00.

R. at

2842-51.
17.

Merena's noncompliance with existing court orders

has not been limited to this case only, but has extended
into other cases as well.

The Record shows that he has not

only been held in contempt of court,by Judge Lindberg, but
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also by Judge Medley in connection with civil number .
074903538.

A copy of Judge Medley's civil contempt order is

found in the Record at 2816-29 (for convenience, a copy is
attached hereto at Addendum 2 ) .

Judge Medley held Merena in

contempt of court for violating a protective order that
Davis had obtained against him.

Following an evidentiary

hearing at which Merena appeared and was represented by
counsel, Judge Medley imposed a monetary fine against Merena
in the amount of $3,000.00, and also ordered him to serve
time in jail, to be stayed upon his timely payment of the
court fine and also timely payment of Davis' costs and
attorney fees.

Icl.

Pertinent portions of the findings and

ruling made by Judge Medley are as follows:
a.

"When [Merena's] testimony is considered in

the context of what can only be described as an obsessive
desire and behavior pattern by [Merena] to take advantage of
every opportunity to maintain some form of contact with
petitioner, [Merena's] testimony that he called petitioner's
mother and did not ask her to contact petitioner is
unbelievable."
b.

Addendum 2, at 7.
"Respondent's conduct in this regard can only

be described as threatening, intimidating and demonstrates
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an absence of balance and a suggestion of serious mental
health challenges."
c.

Id. at 10.

'

"[R]espondent's highly suspect conduct weighs

heavily against his credibility which is nonexistent."
d.

Id.

"The Court finds by clear and convincing

evidence that the placing of the tracking device on Ms.
Merena's vehicle occurred after the Protective Order was
issued, and that is in clear violation of the Protective
Order."

Id. at 8.
e.

"Irrespective of the outstanding warrants, the

respondent has engaged in despicable, frightening conduct .
toward petitioner."
18.

Jd. at 9.

Judge Medley's contempt order indicatea that

criminal charges have been filed against Merena in the State
of Montana, which charges remain outstanding.
19.

Icl. at 9. •

Despite the litany of sanctions that have been

imposed against him, apparently without any real effect,
Merena has continued to pursue litigation against Davis.
Among other things, he has caused a second complaint for
defamation to be filed against Davis in Third District
Court, civil number 090403270, .Judge Kouris presiding. . Not
coincidentally, Mer.ena is represented by the same counsel in
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that case as is currently representing him in this appeal.
In the second defamation action, Merena has filed a sworn
declaration revealing that he has left Utah and is now
residing out of the country.

Addendum 3.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.

It is undisputed that Merena has sought to

appeal a non-final, non-appealable order.

Merena readily

admits that he is appealing the- lower court's Ruling ofNovember 20, 2009, and he readily admits that such ruling
was never reduced to a final order.

However, he contends

that his appeal should nevertheless be allowed to proceed,
because he is also appealing "other orders" of the lower
court, which have been reduced to final orders.

Merena

cites to no case law or other- legal authority to support his
position, and Utah law is 'clearly against his position.
Because no final order has been entered in this case,
Merena's appeal is at best premature and must be dismissed.
Merena's appeal should also be dismissed because he has
not properly preserved the issues he is attempting-to
appeal. .Not a single issue presented in Merena's Appellant
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Brief was ever properly raised at the lower court level.
Because Merena has failed to timely and properly raise these
issues below,, he has failed to preserve these issues for
appeal.

His appeal should therefore be dismissed.

Finally, a fair and impartial look at the sanctions
entered against Merena at the lower court level shows that
such sanctions were warranted.

If anything, the lower court

was overly restrained with Merena.

It certainly did not

rush to employ harsh sanctions against him.

Instead, the

court employed a graduated scale of sanctions, first
attempting to employ lesser sanctions before deeming it
necessary to increase the severity of the same.

After

Merena's bad behavior continued unabated, the lower court
was finally prompted to dismiss his complaint.

The

dismissal was entered only as a last resort, and only after
Merena had been given clear, unequivocal notice that further
bad behavior on his part would not be tolerated.

Merena

willfully chose to ignore such warnings and proceed at his
peril.

He cannot now be heard to complain that the

sanctions that were levied against him were too harsh.

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION BECAUSE A FINAL ORDER HAS NOT
BEEN ENTERED

Appellee Davis respectfully moves this Court pursuant
to Rule 10(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
other applicable law for an Order dismissing the instant
appeal on the grounds that Merena has sought to appeal a
non-final, non-appealable order.

Because the lower court

has not entered a final order, Merena's appeal is improper
and not ripe for adjudication.

Consequently, this Court

lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the same should
be dismissed forthwith.1
It is undisputed that Merena is seeking to appeal the

x

On September 22, 2011, Appellee filed a motion to
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that
Merena was improperly seeking to appeal a non-final order.
In response, Merena filed a memorandum in opposition,
admitting that he was appealing the lower court's Ruling of
November 2'0, 2 009, and admitting that said ruling was not a
final order. (See Appellant's Verified Response to
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and/or Motion for
Summary Disposition at 2.) However, Merena argued that he
was also appealing "'other orders and rulings", therefore
somehow justifying his appeal. .Id. This Court subsequently
entered an Order dated October 25, 2011, deferring a ruling
on the jurisdictional issue pending plenary presentation of
the case and directing the Appellee to present the issue in
her brief. Appellee hereby does so and respectfully reasserts her motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
16
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lower court's ruling of November 20, 2009, which sanctioned
Merena for persistent discovery abuses" and for his ongoing
failure to abide by the orders of the court.

(See n.l)

The

ruling in question is attached to Merena's Appellant Brief
at Addendum C.

This ruling has never been reduced to a

final, written order.
appealable order.

As such, it remains a non-final, non-

A review of the lower court docket

indicates that no party has ever submitted an order in
conformity with the court's ruling sufficient to satisfy the
strictures of Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2).

While it appears

that the parties may have simply treated the ruling as the
final expression of the order of the court, such treatment
does not pass muster for purposes of pursuing an appeal.
The explicit requirements of Rule 7(f)(2) have not been
satisfied.

Hence, Merena's appeal is not properly before

this Court, and the same should therefore be dismissed.
The case of Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT
2, 201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009), is on point.

In Giusti, the

Utah Supreme Court had occasion to rule on the timeliness of
an appeal.

The court cited to Rule 7(f)(2) and noted that

the entry of a final order-in conformity with the
requirements of the Rule is what triggers the appeal period.

17
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The court stated as follows:
The rule is clear.' A prevailing party
shall
prepare for entry a proposed order in
conformity with the court's decision. There
are only two exceptions to this mandate.
First, if the court approves a proposed order
that is submitted with an initial memorandum,
then no additional order is necessary. Second,
if the court directs that no additional order
is necessary, then none is.
Giusti, 2009 UT 2, 121

,

(emphasis in original).

In the instant case, the lower court entered its ruling
on November 20, 2009.

Thereafter, it appears that neither

party ever submitted an order to be entered in conformity
with the ruling.

This is fatal to Merena's appeal, because

the requirements of Rule 7(f)(2) remain unsatisfied.

The

two exceptions to Rule 7(f)(2) mentioned by the Giusti court
are simply not present in this case.

No proposed order was

ever submitted by the parties in connection with an initial
memorandum.

I

Likewise, no statement appears in the lower

court's ruling of November 20, 2009, providing that it is
(

the final expression of the court and that no further
additional order is necessary.

By attempting to appeal this

nonfinal ruling, Merena's appeal is improper and ill-taken.

,

Again, according to the Giusti court, an appeal is not
triggered until

the mandate's of Rule 7(f) (2) have been
(
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satisfied.

The Giusti court stated as follows: "It is the

entry of the final order according to rule 7(f)(2) that
triggers the appeal period.

If the court fails to satisfy

rule 7(f) (2)'s exceptions and if the prevailing party fails
to prepare an order for entry, ^the appeal rights of the
nonprevailing party will extend indefinitely.'"

Id. at 535

(citations omitted).
Merena appears to believe that a later order entered by
the lower court on April 8„ 2011, is sufficient to
constitute a final order for purposes of appeal.

Attached .

to his brief at Addendum G is a copy of the order of April
8, 2011.

While on its face it purports to call itself a

"Final Order and Judgment", just because it calls itself a
final order does not make it one.

The order in question

merely reduces to judgment certain monetary sanctions that
had already been entered by the lower court against Merena.
It does nothing more.

It certainly does not purport to be

the "conforming order" contemplated by Rule 7(f)(2) with
respect to the lower court's ruling of November 20, 2009.
As such, no final appealable order has yet been entered by
the lower court in this matte:;,

Merena' s appeal is thus

improper and must be dismissed.

See, e.g., Montgomery v.
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Cottam, 2011 UT App 308, 12 ("Generally, *[a]n appeal is
improper if it is taken from an order or judgment that is
not final.'" (citing Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 19, 5
P.3d 64 9)). .
Based upon the foregoing, this Court lacks jurisdiction
to hear Merena's appeal, and should therefore dismiss the
appeal forthwith.

II. MERENA DID NOT PROPERLY PRESERVE THE ISSUES
HE IS NOW SEEKING TO APPEAL
Setting aside the jurisdictional problem that is fatal
to this appeal, Merena's appeal should also be dismissed
because he has improperly sought to appeal several issues
that were never presented at the lower court level below.
For example, Argument I of Merena's Appellant Brief asserts
that the lower court's sanctions were too harsh and were an
abuse of discretion.
below.

However, this issue was never raised

Likewise Argument II, involving a claim that the

lower court exceeded its authority in acting as a
"collection agency" for Davis, was never raised below.
Additionally, Argument III, involving a request to modify
Utah law and afford Merena the right against selfincrimination at a civil contempt proceeding, was never
20
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raised below.

Merena is not entitled to pursue an appeal of

matters that were not properly raised below.

His appeal

should therefore be summarily dismissed.
Utah law is clear in holding that issues must be
preserved for appeal, or they will be deemed waived.

Only

in very limited, narrow circumstances will an appellate
court review an issue on appeal that was not properly raised
below.

The basic rule in Utah is: "[I]n order to preserve

an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an
opportunity to rule on that issue."

Brookside Mobile Home

Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, f 14, 48 P.3d 968 (citing
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah
1998)).
The need for a party to preserve an issue on appeal by
first raising it below is not a minor, unimportant matter.
Fundamentally, it serves an extremely important purpose.

It

serves to put the lower court on notice of the asserted
error, and it allows for timely correction of the same, if
appropriate.

Badger, 966 P.2d at 847.

For a trial court to

be afforded an opportunity to correct an error, "(1) the
issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue
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must be specifically raised[,] and (3) the challenging party
must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
Brookside, 2002 UT 48 at 1 14 (quoting Badger,

authority."

966 P.2d at 847).

"Issues that are not raised [below] are
i

usually deemed waived."

Id.

In this case, Merena has failed in his Appellant Brief
to demonstrate that he has properly preserved the issues he
is seeking to appeal.

He outright concedes that his third

appellate issue was not properly preserved for appeal, but
he nevertheless argues for an extraordinary exception to
apply (see Appellant Brief at 32-35) .

{

Regarding his first

two appellate issues, his brief is woefully silent as to how
i

or when such issues were preserved for appeal.

Rule

24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires Merena to include in his brief a statement of the

|

issues presented for review and M a citation to the record
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court".
I

Merena's brief

fails

to comply with this

rule.

His

statement of issues presented on appeal is woefully
inadequate and noncompliant.

i

As the party bringing this appeal, Merena has the
burden of complying with all necessary requirements to
<
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perfect an appeal.

Given the size of the record in this

case, it is not the Appellee's obligation to ferret through
the record and attempt to discern where, if at all, Merena
has properly preserved his issues for appeal.

Merena's

noncompliant brief fails to show that he has duly satisfied
his appellate requirements.

Consequently, Merena's appeal

is not well advanced and should be dismissed immediately,
without any further cost, delay, or prejudice to Davis.

III. THE LOWER COURT WAS WELL WITHIN ITS AUTHORITY
TO SANCTION MERENA, AND IT ACTED APPROPRIATELY
IN DOING SO
Throughout the pendency of this case, Merena has acted
as if he is a law unto himself.

He has persistently refused

to abide by the orders of the court, except when it has been
convenient for him to do so.

When rulings and orders have

gone against him, he has filed motions to reconsider or to
alter or amend the court's rulings.
1814.

See, e.g., R. at 1758-

He is the classic example of a vexatious, abusive

litigant.
Even Merena's appellate counsel has conceded it was
appropriate- for the lower court to sanction Merena for his
repeated misconduct and discovery abuses.

(See, e.g..
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Appellant Brief at 11: "It is uncontested that Mr. Merena's
conduct warranted sanctions ...")

However, counsel takes

umbrage with the purported severity of the sanctions that
were imposed, contending that they were too harsh.

Merena's

counsel argues that a simple monetary sanction would have
sufficed as an appropriate punishment in this case.

This

argument is clearly not tenable.
In dealing with Merena's persistent misconduct, the
lower court did not immediately rush to dismiss Merena's
complaint.

Instead, it first considered and imposed lesser

sanctions against him, gradually increasing the severity of
the sanctions until it became absolutely appropriate and
necessary to dismiss Merena's complaint as a last resort.
Initially, the first sanction that was imposed against
Merena was a monetary sanction.

This sanction was imposed

after Merena engaged in improper, abusive written discovery
tactics.

He was ordered to pay costs and attorney fees to

the defendant in a fairly nominal amount ($977.50).

[R. at

938-52, 2476-788.]
Unfortunately, Merena persisted with his abusive
discovery tactics..

After these abuses were brought to the

attention of .-the court, Judge Lindberg issued a ruling
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expressing concern that Merena was using this case for an
improper purpose, i.e., to vex and harass Davis, rather than
to advance meritorious claims.2

The court deemed it

appropriate to warn Merena about his behavior, and directed
him to improve his conduct.

R. at 1377-81.

The court

stated that it would continue to give him the benefit of the
doubt for now, but directed him to adhere to the standards
of professionalism and civility.

The court also explicitly

cautioned him not to engage in any further obstreperous
conduct.

Xd.

The court ruled: "Mr. Merena is put on notice

that the Court will not tolerate further obstreperous
behavior on his part.

Mr. Merena cannot

abusive discovery practices."

continue with

Id.

After Merena sought leave to complete certain discovery
requests, the lower court granted him permission to do so.
At the same time, the court deemed it necessary to put
certain limitations in place.

In doing so, the court again

put Merena on notice that he needed to comply with the

2

Despite Merena's assertions to the contrary, the lower
court never found his claims to be meritorious. The lower
court never had occasion to reach the merits of this case,
because Merena's claims were dismissed before trial.
Consequently, the lower court could only, at best, deem
Merena's claims to be potentially
meritorious.
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court's discovery limitations.

R. at 1860-63.

Despite being given clear, ample warning by'the lower
court that further misconduct on his part would not be
tolerated, Merena nevertheless chose to ignore such
i

warnings.

At his own peril, he willfully proceeded to

disregard the discovery limitations that had been imposed
upon him, intentionally violating the scope of permissible

(

discovery by taking unnecessarily prolonged depositions and
asking completely improper, irrelevant questions of deposed •
i

witnesses.

[R. at 2213-87, 2498-05.]

As a. result, the

lower court was finally compelled to dismiss his complaint,
but only as a last resort.

'

(

It is important to note that Merena's malfeasance in
this case was not an isolated, single event.

Instead, it

was part .of a pattern of ongoing, egregious misconduct
spanning not only the entirety of this case but also pouring
over into other cases involving Merena and Davis as parties „•
rSee, e.g., R. at 1248-75 (bankruptcy proceeding) and also
Addendum 2 (protective order proceeding).]
It is clear from the history of this case that Merena
has not"been deterred by simple'monetary sanctions,

He has

repeatedly ignored such sanctions,' and he has not paid a
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single cent-towards satisfying them.-

Hence, monetary

sanctions alone have no meaning to Merena, and are
absolutely not an adequate remedy to compel him to behave.
Regarding Merena's claim that the lower court should
have been more lenient with him as a pro se litigant, it has
already been amply demonstrated above that the court
afforded him more than adequate latitude and patience,
probably much more than he deserved.

At this juncture of

the.case, Merena should not be afforded any more leniency.
•He is, for all intents and purposes, a professional
litigant.

He is no stranger to the litigation process,

having been involved in numerous court actions, including a
reported case dating back nearly 30 years.
655 P.. 2d 875 (Hawaii 1982). .

Fong v. Merena,

He does not- respect the court

system, as is clear from his lack of compliance with, the
numerous court orders that have been entered against him,
which remain unsatisfied,
48; Addendum 2.)

(See, e.g., R. at 2498-05, 2842-

Simply stated, Merena is not deserving of

any more latitude or leniency.
Merena has not shown good cause to afford him relief
from the sanctions that have been entered''against him.
appeal should therefore be denied.
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H£s--

IV. MERENA HAS NO STANDING TO REQUEST A CHANGE IN
UTAH LAW
Very little needs'to be said in response to Merena's
argument that Utah law should be altered to afford him a
right against self-incrimination-at a civil contempt
hearing.

Despite having been given clear notice of the

contempt hearing in this case, and despite having been
ordered to appear at the hearing upon threat of an arrest
warrant being issued in his absence, Merena
show

up.

did

not

even

As a result, he made no incriminating statements

at the hearing, and the burden of proof never shifted to him
to do anything at the hearing.
The basis for holding Merena in contempt of court was
well outlined in Davis' contempt motion (R. at 2669-80), in
the evidence presented at the contempt hearing (see R. at
2814-15), and in the lower court's "Contempt Hearing
Decision" (a copy of which is attached to Merena's Brief at
Addendum E ) .

Merena has advanced no legitimate reason to

upset the contempt order sanctions that were entered against
him, inasmuch as he did not even bother to attend the
_contempt hearing.3

His request to alter Utah law to afford

3

Regarding Merena's assertion that the lower court
improperly shifted the burden of proof to him on the issue
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him a right against self-incrimination lacks merit.

His

appeal should therefore be denied.

CONCLUSION
Merena's appeal (his third attempt to file an appeal in
this matter) is untimely,

Merena has once again improperly

attempted to appeal a non-final order.

Because Merena's

appeal has not been properly taken, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to' hear the appeal, and should dismiss the same
forthwith.
Merena's appeal also fails on its merits.

Merena has

of whether he had the ability to pay contempt sanctions,
this argument lacks merit- and. is not properly advanced on
appeal. Once again, this issue was never properly raised
below. Further, to the extent that Merena is attempting to
challenge the lower court's contempt findings,, he has not
carried his marshaling burden. His argument is therefore
not well taken. Moreover, the Record amply supports a
finding that Merena had an ability to pay contempt
sanctions. For one thing, he has never had a problem paying
for the army of attorneys that.have represented him in this
case, nor has he had a problem paying for the army of
attorneys that have represented him in the companion cases
occurring simultaneously with this one. As well, he has
never had a problem covering the cost of the mountain of
paperwork he has filed in this case7 deluging the lower
.court docket, A fair and reasonable inference can easiVyvbe
drawn that at all times material herein he has had the
ability to pay the monetary sanctions that have been entered
against him. He has simply chosen not to pay those
sanctions. It appears he has no intention of ever doing so.
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not set forth any appropriate, legitimate basis for
"reversing the rulings and orders of the lower court.. He was

,

properly sanctioned by the lower court, and he has not shown
any reason on appeal to upset the sanctions that have been
entered against him.

Further, he has not even properly

preserved the issues he is seeking to appeal.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should summarily
dismiss Merena's appeal, and order that the cost bond he has
posted be released to Davis.

This Court should enter such

further and additional relief to Davis as it may deem to be

{

just and proper in the premises.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1<?TU day of
i

Novfr^S-e^

, 2 011.
MORRISON LAW OFFICE, INC.

UAM
Will Morrison
Attorney for Appellee

{
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This certifies that on the 2ffiu day of
Nitw<ev*l»e^ /
2011, I caused to be served, via U.S. mail first class and
postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellee Brief, to the following:
Loren M. Lambert
David S. Head
Arrow Legal Solutions Group, PC
266 East 7200 South
Midvale, UT 84047

(Attorneys

for

Appellant)
UAAU

/k^-v^v^^

Will Morrison
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM
1.

Merena's Previous Efforts to Appeal

2.

Judge Medley Contempt Order

3.

Declaration of Kenneth Merena
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FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

SEP 1 1 2009
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Ken Merena and dba Merena
Investments,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,

ORDER
Case No. 20090723-CA

Alice M. Merena,
Defendant and Respondent.

Before Judges Bench, Orme, and McHugh.
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mr. Merena failed to
timely file his petition for interlocutory appeal. See Utah R.
App. P. 5(a) (requiring that petitions for interlocutory appeal
be filed withing twenty days after entry of the applicable
order) .
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to
appeal is denied.
Dated this

/ / * * - ;day of September, 2 009

FOR THE COURT:

M^si^/J.J&^iJL
Russell W. Bench, Judge'
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Ken Merena, Pro Se
44 W. Broadway #1003S
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 372-9349
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KEN MERENA, an individual, and dba
MERENA INVESTMENTS. ••'

NOTICE OF APPEAL
:
Civil No. 070915206

Plaintiff and Appellant
Judge: Denise P. Lindberg
vs.
ALICE M. MERENA,
Defendant and Appellee
Notice is hereby given that Kenneth A. Merena, Plaintiff and Appellant in the above captioned
case, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the Final Order of the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg,
entered in this matter on October 30, 2009. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment

DATED this fO day of November, 2009.
{

Ken Merena
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UTAH APPELLATE. COURTS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEC 21 2003

-.-OOOOO

Ken Merena, an individual,
and dba Merena Investments,

* ' ORDER OF DISMISSAL

<

Plaintiff and Appellant,

/

Case No.. 20090941-CA

v,
A l i c e M. Merena,
Defendant and A p p e l l e e ,
On December 1, 2 009, this court issued a Sua Sponte Motion
for Summary Disposition on grounds that the October 30, 2009
order from which this appeal is taken is .not a final, appealable
order and requiring the parties to submit responses stating why
the appeal should, or should not, be dismissed, without
prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. The parties now stipulate
that the October 30, 2009 order is not final and appealable and
the appeal is'premature. We.construe the stipulation as a
request for voluntary dismissal of the appeal filed pursuant to
rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of a timely notice"of appeal after the
district court enters a final, appealable order. The parties are
to bear their own costs and attorney fees incurred in' this
appeal.
Dated this %LdL.
.&\

of December, 2009

FOR THE COURT:

?
William A. Thome Jr., Judg
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UTAH APPELLATE G0UR1

DEC - h 20QS
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOop
Ken Merena, an individual,
and dba Merena Investments,

/

ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case'No. 20090941-CA
v.
Alice M. Merena,
Defendant and Appellee,
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Thome.
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Ken Merena's
Petition for Emergency- Relief for Stay of District Court
Proceedings, filed pursuant to rule .8A of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Proceedings, and Motion and Application for Stay of
District Court Proceedings, filed pursuant to rule, 8 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.1
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for emergency relief
and the motion and application for a stay of the district court
proceedings are each denied.
Dated this

L day of December, 2009

FOR THE COURT:

William A. Thome, Judge

1. Although Plaintiff has included additional language in the
titles for his petition and motion," this order disposes of all
"requests made in the ;combined filing, however captioned.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALICE MICHELLE MERENA, nka
ALICE MICHELLE DAVIS,

:
t

CONTEMPT HEARING DECISION
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
:

CASE NO, 074903538

vs.
•
KENNETH ALLEN MERENA,
Respondent.

An^-evi'deKfeTQ-ry — hearings-*was~~ -held— on-... April — 3 0,.. ._2 Q10 > >,...pn-:...tJhLe.,.._:,
petitioner's request that the respondent be found and held in contempt
of Court for alleged violations of a cohabitant abuse Protective Order.
The petitioner was present and represented by her counsel, Grant W. P.
Morrison.

The respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Amy

E. Hayes Kennedy.

The parties, having been duly sworn and examined .under

oath, and witnesses having, testified on behalf of the parties,

and

documentary evidence having been marked and received by the Court, and
the Court having heard the arguments of counsel for petitioner

and

respondent,

the

and

having

inquired

into

the

legal

sufficiency

of

evidence so adduced, and being fully advised in the premises, does now
make and adopt the following:
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MSRENA V. MERENA

PAGE 2

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

FINDINGS OF FACT
1

The Court finds that these parties have an extensive, and at

times extremely contentious, litigation history with one another, as
follows:
a.

The Annulment:

The petitioner filed for divorce from

respondent on August 20, 2007, in Civil No. 074903660..DA,
Decree of Annulment was entered on May 6, 2009.

A Bifurcated

Other than dissolution

of the marriage and restoration of petitioner to the use of her maiden
surname, no other claims have been resolved in this case.
b.

The

Protective

Order

(the

instant

matter):

The

petitioner filed for a Temporary Protective Order on August 14, 2007.
A Protective Order was stipulated to and entered on August 20, 2007.

A

Modified Protective Order, which allows the parties to be present at and
personally participate in all hearings, meetings or other required events
occurring in any civil litigation to which the petitioner and respondent
are parties/rwas entered on April 17, 2008.

The petitioner's Motion for

Certification of Contempt for Violation of Protective Order .and for
Attorney's Fees was filed in August 2009.
c.

The First Slander Case: In October 2007, the respondent

filed a suit against petitioner seeking damages and injunctive relief due
to alleged slanderous statements made by petitioner.

In November 2009,

Civil No. 070915206 MI was dismissed by Judge Lindberg as a sanction
against respondent due to discovery abuses in that case.
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Judge Lindberg

MERENA V. MERENA

PAGE 3

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

also ordered that petitioner receive a partial award of attorney's fees,
which as of the evidentiary hearing have not been determined.
d.

The Bankruptcy.

In January 2008, the petitioner filed

for bankruptcy relief in Montana and named respondent as a creditor,
prompting the respondent to initiate an Adversary Proceeding against
petitioner- After a trial in December 2008, the Adversary Proceeding was
dismissed on March 10, 2009.
e.

The

Second

Slander

Case:

In

February

2 009, the

respondent filed a second slander suit against petitioner, alleging
further incidents of slander and seeking damages and injunctive relief.
In March 2009, the petitioner filed an Answer and Counterclaim in Civil
No. 090403270 in which she alleges that the respondent's conduct in the
aforementioned

actions

proceedings/abuse

of

support

process,

distress, and libel/slander.
respondent.

claims

intentional

for

wrongful

infliction

of

civil

emotional

Petitioner seeks monetary damages from

This action remains pending and discovery is ongoing.

f.

The Small Claims Case: On or about October 16, 2 0 07, a

person by the name of Yu Zhao filed a small claims action against
petitioner for recovery of a loan.
Fourth District Court, Stzte

On or about November 27, 2 007, the

of Utah,_ Prcvo Small Claims Department,

entered a Small Claims Judgment against petitioner in the total amount
of $300.

Mr. Zhao and respondent are close friends and have been

business partners.

Respondent, assisting Mr. Zhao or acting as his
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

attorney, paid $1,700 to Elwin Kirkwood, a process server in Montana,
and obtained a Writ of Execution in Montana with respect to Zhao's $800
Utah Small Claims Judgment. On or about January 17, 2008, based upon the
Zhao Judgment, had petitioner's 2003 Honda Civic seized in Montana.
.2

The Court finds that the in her Affidavit in Support of Motion

for Certification of Contempt for Violation of the Protective Order and
for Attorney's Fees, the petitioner alleges four distinct charges of
contempt against respondent, which are described and hereinafter referred
to as follows:
a.

Charge 1: ' That ah email sent by respondent to'petitioner

on September 9, 20 07, violated Paragraph 2 of the Protective Order
entered by this Court on August 20, 2007;
b.

Charge 2: That a telephone call placed by respondent to

petitioner's-mother, Marlene Davis, on November 10, 2007, and the ensuing
22 minute conversation violated Paragraph 2 of the Protective Order
entered by this Court on August 20, 2007;
c.

Charge 3: That the respondent violated Paragraph 4 of the

Protective Order entered by this Court on August 20, 2007, by allegedly
placing a tracking device on her vehicle;
c.

Charge 4:

That emails sent by respondent to petitioner

within the context of the First Slander Case and his general conduct in
this and other litigation with petitioner constitutes ''harassment" and
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MERENA V. MERENA

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

thereby violated Paragraph 1 of the Protective Order entered by this
Court on August 20, 2007.
3

The Protective Order at issue in the instant action states, on

page 1, "The court orders the Respondent to obey all'orders initialed on
this form and to not abuse or threaten to abuse anyone protected by this
order7'.
it".

It further indicates that ^No one except the court can change

The initialed portions of the Order are stated as follows, in

pertinent part,
1. Personal Conduct Order. Do not commit, try to commit or
threaten to commit any form of violence against the Petitioner
of any.'person'listed on page 1 of this" form.' This includes
stalking, harassing, threatening, physically hurting, or cause
any other form of abuse.
2. No Contact Order. Do not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, or
communicate in any way with the Petitioner, either directly or
indirectly.
4. Stay Away Order. Stay away from: The Petitioner's current
or future vehicle, job, home, premises and property.

4

Charge Is

The Court finds beyond any reasonable doubt that

Kenneth A. Merena knowingly and intentionally and willfully violated the
Protective Order, as follows:
a.

Less

char, three

weeks

following

the

entry

of the

Protective Order, prior to the modification, which event occurred on or
about September 9, 2007 (the Protective Order was issued on August 20,
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

2007), he sent, by email, a letter to the petitioner. Respondent admits
to sending the letter to petitioner.
b.

The first paragraph of the letter states, VXI realize that

I am taking * a great risk in writing to you directly, but it is a risk
that I feel that I must take.: If you choose to hurt me by using the fact
that I have contacted you directly, I will accept that and suffer the
consequences of my own actions. However, I think it is so important that
you hear certain things directly from me, that I must take the risk.
hope that you won't use this against me.

I

I am putting my trust in you-

I ask that' ypti try to "do"the" "same for* me*'. *
5

The Court finds that Mr. Merena knew of the Protective Order,

having stipulated to its entry, and, further, knew that he was not to
contact or email or write Ms. Davis.

Indeed, Mr. Merena, in his letter,

acknowledges his violation in this very writing.

Irrespective of. the

Protective Order, Mr. Merena sent Ms. Davis an email .letter, on or about
September

9,

2 0 07,

in

clear

violation

the

Protective

particularly paragraph 2, that prohibits that very action.

Order

and

The Court

finds that Mr. Merena's claimed justification for sending the letter to
prevent

petitioner

from

committing

"justification is without merit.

suicide

or

some

other

moral

The Court finds'Mr. Merena has violated

the Protective Order and he is found in contempt for this violation.
6

Charge 2:

The Court finds that Mr. Merena next contacted the

petitioner's mother on or about November 10, 2007 and claimed he had been
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involved in a motorcycle accident and received severe head trauma and
spinal cord injuries.

Although the evidence is conflicting, the Court

finds that respondent then asked the petitioner's mother, Marlene Davis,
to pass along to Alice how sorry he was and that he wasn't thinking
rationally at the time of the incident -in Silver Gate, and to please tell
Alice I love'her and miss her.
7

The Court finds by clear. and convincing evidence . that Mr.

Merena's communication with petitioner's mother is a clear violation of
the

Protective

communicating",

Order,
either

particularly
directly

or

paragraph

indirectly

2,
with

that

prohibits

the petitioner-.-

Respondent's testimony that he did not ask Marlene Davis, to communicate
with petitioner

is not

credible.

When

respondent's

testimony

is

considered in the context of what can only be described as an obsessive
desire and behavior pattern by respondent -to take advantage of every
opportunity *' to

maintain

some

form

of

contact

with

petitioner,

respondent's,.testimony that he called petitioner's mother and did not ask
her to contact petitioner is unbelievable.
8

Charge 3:

The Court finds that Mr. Merena contacted Elwin

Kirkwood, a Registered Process Server in the. State of Montana in an
effort: to enf-roe Mr. Zhao's Utah $3 00 small clair.s Jo.o-grnent. The Court
finds that during one or more of the conversations .with Mr. Kirkwood,
that Kenneth Merena advised Mr. Kirkwood that he, Kenneth Merena, had
placed a tracking device on Ms. Merena's automobile.
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that Mr. Kirkwood's testimony was very credible.

That Mr. Kirkwood is

a disinterested third party witness who was well spoken and had excellent
recall of his conversations with respondent. Mr. Kirkwood testified that
respondent knew of petitioner's location, who petitioner associated with
and knew of where and when petitioner's children:went to school.

The

Court finds .that respondent's stated knowledge of petitioner's and her
children's daily activities is consistent with respondent's statement to
Mr. Kirkwood that he (respondent) put a tracking device on petitioner's
vehicle so he could follow her at all times.

Further, Mr, Kirkwood

testif ied'-that respondent "was- persl'S'teiit'iri Talking stbout personal" themes'"
between respondent and petitioner and that respondent threatened he was
going to contact petitioner's ex-husband to try to get petitioner's
children taken away from her. The Court finds respondent's obsessive and
irrational behavior towards petitioner is frightening and in violation
of this Court's Protective Order.

Respondent's testimony

that Mr.

Kirkwood's testimony is full of lies, that he (respondent) doesn't recall
the name of^a private detective he hired and that he stipulated to the
Protective Order without knowledge of what he was doing is not credible.
3

The Court further finds that Mr, -Merena told Mr. Kirkwood to

remove the tracking device from the vehicle.

The Court finds by clear

and convincing evidence that the placing of the tracking device on Ms.
Merena's vehicle occurred after the -Protective Order was issued, and that
it is in clear violation of the Protective Order.
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• Charge 4 s

The Court

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

finds that

in November 2007, the

petitioner reported the conduct described as Charges 1 and 2 to the
Billings

(Montana)

Police

Department,

and that

as a result,

two

misdemeanor charges have been filed against respondent, for which a
Warrant for -Arrest was issued by the Municipal Court of th:e City of
Billings on January 31, 2008.

As of the date of the present hearing,

respondent has not appeared in the Montana Municipal Court and the
Warrants and charges remain outstanding. Irrespective of the outstanding
warrants, the respondent has engaged in despicable, frightening conduct
"toward petitibner.""""' For "example,'*'he has gone far beyond" the allowance
given him by Judge Lindberg in the libel and slander case.

He opted to

represent himself, and in an email couched as a "type" of interrogatory,
sought

"the name, address, phone number and e-mail of the man you slept

with in Bozeman, Montana on your way back to Billings, MT, after your
August 21, 2 0 07 departure from Salt Lake City."

x

He also, in the same

email, sought "The name of the person that owns the silver Honda that has
been parked in your carport for the last three weeks (approximately) ."

1

Kenneth A- Merena had filed a libel and slander action against Alice Merena and
deposed her on the 13th day of February, 2009, Although Judge Lindberg allowed the
deposition, she was clear :,i a hearing prior to the d-position that Mr, Merena was not to violate
. the Protective Order in pb :e. She allowed the parries to communicate only by email, and that
communication could only relate to the libel and slander lawsuit. Following Alice Merena on her
way back to Montana, or having her followed, is a clear violation of the Protective Order, as is
the next paragraph relating to knowledge of a vehicle in her carport for the prior three weeks.
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This email was sent to Alice Davis on or about the 26th day of February,
2009.

In addition, he has asked questions via email that far surpassed

the limits allowed by Judge Lindberg, including demanding communication
"That would necessarily require you to check your specially created email account for messages on a regular basis, at a minimum, daily" .
11

The Court finds that respondent's conduct described herein is

far beyond '"what was
Indeed,

even

Judge

contemplated
Lindberg

in the Amended

addressed

in her

Protective

Memorandum

Order.

Decision

dismissing Mr. Merena's case against Alice Merena, (Case No. 0709152 06)
that his excesses relating to discovery resulted in*the dismissal of the
case and

sanctions being

imposed.

Mr. Merena's

relying

on

Judge

Lindberg's Order was.ill taken and evidence introduced at trial did not
support his argument.

Respondent's conduct in this regard>can only be

described as threatening, intimidating and demonstrates an absence of
balance and a suggestion of serious mental health challenges.
with regard \to Charge 4, the Court finds that respondent's
litigation

conduct

statutory

definition

although

very

of harassment

troubling,
in Utah

does

not

Code Ann.,

However,
general

satisfy

the

§ 76-5-106,

therefore, Charge 4 has not been proven by clear and convincing evidence
and is ordered dismissed.

It should be noted, however, that' respondent's

highly suspect conduct weighs heavily against his credibility which is
nonexistent.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

The Court has jurisdiction over both parties and the subject

matter in this case.
2

The Court, finds beyond any reasonable doubt and by clear and

convincing evidence as referenced herein that respondent Kenneth Merena
is in contempt of the Court's Orders, without justification, as reflected
in the Findings of Fact as to Charges 1, 2 and 3.

Charge 4 is Ordered

dismissed.
3

Based upon respondent's egregious and contemptuous conduct,

respondent is Ordered to serve thirty (30) days in the Salt Lake County
Jail on each'of the three charges for a total of ninety (90) days, to run
consecutively without any credit for good time served and not to be
released to home confinement or ankle monitoring.
4

.The Court-Ordered jail time is stayed for a period of time

commensurate with the period of time the Modified Protective Order
remains in effect, which under Utah Code Ann., § 78B-7-106(10), is an
indefinite period of time until modified or vacated by the Court.

Based

upon respondent's conduct- described herein, petitioner is in need of and
is entitled to protection- from respondent for the maximum time available
under the law.

This

st:.y

is conditioned upon respondent's

strict

compliance with the specific terms of the Modified Protective Order and
timely payment of the fines, costs and attorney fees provided for herein.
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Based upon respondent/s contemptuous conduct and Utah Code

Ann., § 78B-6-310, the Court elects to impose a fine upon respondent in
the amount of $1,000 on each of the three charges, for a total of $3,000
to be paid in full within thirty (30) days of entry of this Contempt
Hearing Decision.
6
Court's

,

.-• In accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 78B-6-311, and the
Inherent Authority, petitioner

is awarded

Judgment

against

respondent for her costs, expenses and reasonable attorney fees, to be
supported by Affidavit and which shall be satisfied by respondent within
thirty (30) days ""of entry of the Judgment.

Griffith v. Griffith/ 985

P.2d 255 (Ut. Sup. Ct. 1999); Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487
' (Ut. Ct. App'. 1994) .
7

This signed Contempt Hearing Decision shall constitute the

Order and Judgment of the • Court, counsel and parties should govern
themselves accordingly.
Dated this

0

day of June, 2010.

TYRONE E- MEDLEY
" C ^'O 1* ^H" 1
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the'
foregoing Contempt Hearing Decision,. Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, to the following, this

\

day of June, 2010:

Grant W. P. -Morrison
Matthew G. Morrison
Attorneys for Petitioner
352 East 900? South
•Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
'Amy E."Hayes Kennedy
Attorney for Respondent
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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